ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀπήρκει
(Moer. ο 34, Poll. 9.154)

D. General commentary

Atticist lexicographers are interested in the use of the third person of ἀπαρκέω as used in impersonal constructions. We understand why this is so only if we examine all the documentation of ἀπαρκέω, which reveals that the third person form (mostly impersonal, but also personal) is by far the most attested form of this verb.

Moeris (A.1) aims to inform the reader that the comparatively rare impersonal ἀπαρκεῖ has an Attic pedigree, as documented by Aristophanes’ οὐκ ἀπήρκει (C.2; for the exegesis of A.1 as a synonymic-onomastic rather than prescriptive gloss, see F.1; for the syntactic interpretation of the brief Aristophanes quotation, see F.2). Pollux (A.2) lists the impersonal form ἀπαρκεῖ together with ἀρκεῖἀρκεῖ, ἐξαρκεῖἐξαρκεῖ, and other impersonal verbs and expressions which have the meaning ‘it is enough’ and ‘it suffices’. Neither Pollux nor Moeris express any judgment on ἀπαρκεῖ vis-à-vis its uncompounded equivalent ἀρκεῖ, nor do they openly regard one as preferable to another. Thomas Magister’s (B.1) Byzantine-era preference for ἀπαρκεῖ over ἀρκεῖ, even though it is unparalleled in ancient sources, becomes less puzzling once we read it against the background of the uneven distribution of ἀπαρκέω and ἀρκέω from antiquity to modern times (see below and E.).

From a semantic perspective, ἀπαρκέω ‘to suffice’ by and large overlaps with ἀρκέωἀρκεῖ (see LSJ s.v. III). The only significant difference lies in the intensifying nuance that was originally conveyed by the preverb ἀπο- (see Dieterich 1909, 127–40 and Hernández Socas 2020, 216–7)Intensification. Beside ἀπαρκέω, there is another intensified compound: ἐξαρκέωἐξαρκεῖ. The compound verbs ἀπαρκέω and ἐξαρκέω perhaps stand in the same relationship to ἀρκέω as German ausreichen is to reichen (both of which mean ‘to suffice’).

Beside a single occurrence in Solon (C.1), ἀπαρκέω is attested only rarely in the classical period: 4x in tragedy (meaning ‘to be enough’ in Aesch. Pers. 474 ἀπήρκεσαν and Ag. 379 ἀπαρκεῖν, Soph. OC 1769 ἀπαρκοῖ, Eur. fr. 892.4 ἀπαρκεῖ; unlike LSJ s.v. and GE s.v., DGE s.v. correctly assigns the meaning ‘to be enough’ to Aesch. Ag. 379), 1x in Aristophanes (C.2), and 1x in Demosthenes (19.150, albeit with the meaning ‘to be contented’). Notice that already in these early occurrences, the verb occurs mostly in the third person. Thus, it appears that ἀπαρκέω is not a common verb, especially compared to ἀρκέω and ἐξαρκέω. If we look at the evidence from Homer until the end of the 5th century, ἀρκέω is attested around 150x and ἐξαρκέω around 40x. Aristophanes is the only known canonical author from the classical period who uses ἀπαρκέω in an impersonal construction (see F.1). In Hellenistic times, impersonal ἀπαρκεῖ is only attested in Herodas (C.3), where it likely functions as an intensifier to express a mother’s anger in scolding her son’s unruly behaviourIntensification. In imperial writers, ἀπαρκέω becomes more common, beginning with an occurrence in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (C.4). The absence of ἀπαρκέω in Atticising prose may be explained by the fact that the Attic pedigree of ἀπαρκέω is uncertain, compared to competing verbs such as ἀρκέω and ἐξαρκέω, which in turn are abundantly documented in imperial Atticising prose (see also F.1). To give just one instructive example, Aelius Aristides uses ἀρκεῖ and ἤρκει respectively 10x and 14x and ἐξαρκεῖ and ἐξήρκει respectively 23x and 8x, but he seems never to have used ἀπαρκεῖ or ἀπήρκει. This avoidance does not indicate that ἀπαρκέω was regarded as a colloquialism or belonged to a lower register in Post-classical Greek, for the only three attestations of ἀπαρκέω in documentary sources occur in official texts (C.5, C.6) or as part of a judicial discussion where using an emphatic and elevated tone is also an important factor (C.7; see F.5 and F.6 respectively on C.6 and C.7). By way of comparison, ἀρκέω is used in a range of informal and bureaucratic documentary texts far more frequently than ἀπαρκέω and in a larger variety of forms of the verbal conjugation; to name but a few occurrences, see ἀρκεῖ in O.Krok.2.177.7 (= TM 704462) [Krokodilo, 98–117 CE] and O.Krok.2.224.7 (= TM 704509) [Krokodilo, 98–138 CE], τὰ ἀρκοῦντα in P.Sakon. 33.26 (= TM 13051) [Ptolemais Euergetis, 318–20 CE], ἀρκούμενος in P.Oxy. 52.3691.13 (= TM 15331) [Oxyrhynchus, 139 CE], ἀρκείσθω in SB 18.13303.19 (= TM 25345) [provenance unknown, 1st century CE], and ἀρκέσει in P.Berl.Frisk. 4.19 (= TM 32880) [provenance unknown, 4th–5th century CE]. Further, while in early Christian writings ἀρκέω is a perfectly common word, ἀπαρκέω occurs only 1x, in a passage from Plea for Christians (Leg. 34.3) by Athenagoras of AthensAthenag. Leg. 34.3, and in this single occurrence the form is ἀπαρκεῖ. The Plea for Christians is a peculiar work in the context of early apologetic writings because of its philosophical scope and rhetorical force (the addressee is the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius; see Marcovich 1990, 2–3). Thus, the use of ἀπαρκέω may well count as an element of non-ordinary Greek vocabulary.

This distribution of evidence for the use of ἀπαρκέω suggests some preliminary conclusions. For a start, ἀπαρκέω retains its intensifying function in Imperial Greek textsIntensification. Beside Herodas, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (C.4) uses ἀπαρκέω in an ironic and slightly hyperbolic remark. Secondly, while ἀρκέω is used quite freely in all contexts, the intensified form ἀπαρκέω may be particularly suited to texts which convey a sense of objectivity through a more peremptory tone. Official documents are an example, but such a nuance may also be present in literary texts. The mother chastising her son in the passage by Herodas (C.3) is one such example, where the parent clearly occupies a higher and more powerful position in reproaching her child’s behaviour.

The relationship between ἀπαρκέω and ἀρκέω may be explored further. Although ἀπαρκέω is relatively uncommon, five writers are particularly fond of it: Sextus Empiricus, Ptolemy, Arrian, Eusebius, and Didymus Caecus. We approach each of them individually below.

(i) SextusSextus Empiricus uses ἀπαρκέω only 7x, mostly in the impersonal future ἀπαρκέσει (5x: M. 1.91, 3.3, 4.3, 10.238, 11.40). He never uses the present ἀπαρκεῖ, which is rather notable, given that ἀπαρκεῖ is the single best attested form of ἀπαρκέω in Greek. Not only is ἀπαρκέσει otherwise attested only 4x in Greek as a whole (impersonal in Ptol. Alm. 1,2.211.11, personal in Ptol. Alm. 1,2.429.18 and Anon. in Cat. 31.33, personal in Theodorus Prodromus Carmen in Manuelem I imperatorem 88 [note that in the same line there occurs also ἐξαρκέσει]), but the only other attested future form of ἀπαρκέω is ἀπαρκέσουσι, which is also used only by Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.242). Along the same lines, Sextus uses the future ἀρκέσει more frequently than the present ἀρκεῖ (11x versus 4x). In several of these occurrences, the future and the present tense would have virtually the same meaning: compare, for example, ἀπαρκέσει ταῦτ’ εἰρῆσθαι in M. 11.40 δείγματος μὲν οὖν χάριν ἀπαρκέσει ταῦτ’ εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τῆς τἀγαθοῦ νοήσεως (‘For exemplification’s sake, it will suffice to say these things regarding the concept of Good’) with ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα μόνα εἰρῆσθαι in D.H. Comp. 3 ἐμοὶ δ’ ὑπομνήσεως ἕνεκα λέγοντι ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα μόνα εἰρῆσθαι (‘It is enough for me to say only these things as a reminder’). We might speculate accordingly regarding the reason why Sextus makes the unusual choice to use ἀπαρκέσει and ἀρκέσει instead of the present form: while the present ἀρκεῖ is extremely common in Greek, the future forms ἀπαρκέσει and ἀρκέσει may have been favoured as less obvious. Sextus’ writings also display a clear dualism between ἀπαρκέσει and ἀρκέσει: in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, the only future forms Sextus uses are those of ἀρκέω, while in Adversus mathematicos, he only uses those of ἀπαρκέω, even though ἀρκέω is more common than ἀπαρκέω in both texts (ἀρκέω: 24x in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 16x in Adversus mathematicos; ἀπαρκέω: 1x in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 6x in Adversus mathematicos). Although ἀρκέω is the more common form, the impersonal future ἀπαρκέσει (5x) may have been favoured in Adversus mathematicos as even more conspicuous than the simple verb ἀρκέσει (although it is unclear why Sextus would limit this preference to this text alone). One might also observe that the only occurrence of ἀπαρκέω in Outlines of Pyrrhonism is an optative (ἀπαρκοῖεν), which is scarcely paralleled not only for ἀπαρκέω (the only other instance is Soph. OC 1769) but also for ἀρκέω (the optative of ἀρκέω is used twice by Xenophon and Galen, reappears in late antiquity, and then becomes more common, albeit only in high-register Byzantine texts). All this evidence points toward the conclusion that ἀπαρκέω was assigned a specialised function, not necessarily in terms of semantics or pragmatics but rather on a strictly lexical level.

(ii) Ptolemy’sPtolemy use of ἀπαρκέω is somewhat exceptional in that he uses ἀπαρκέω (9x) and ἀρκέω (11x) interchangeably. One may infer that a technical writer such as Ptolemy may have regarded intensified ἀπαρκέω as more suitable than ἀρκέω, in line with the principle formulated above that ἀπαρκέω may be particularly appropriate for texts which aim to convey a sense of authority. Ptolemy uses impersonal ἀπαρκέω once in the present form ἀπαρκεῖ (Harm. 1.16) and twice in the aorist ἀπήρκεσε (Alm. vol. 1,2.367.11–3, Geog. 1.6.2). Future ἀπαρκέσει is only attested in the personal construction (Alm. vol. 1,2.429.17–9), while ἀρκέσει is used in both constructions (impersonal Alm. vol. 1,1.26.8, vol. 1,1.209.5, and vol. 1,1.465.21, personal Alm. vol. 1,1.219.18). Ptolemy’s use of the aorist also deserves consideration. The aorist of ἀπαρκέω is attested only 8x from Aeschylus to Michael Psellus (and not always with the meaning ‘to suffice’), and as such it counts as a rarity. Ptolemy uses the aorist form ἀπήρκεσε in the apodosis of conditional clauses (Alm. vol. 1,2.367.11–3 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ ἐκκέντρου τὸ κέντρον ἐφέρετο τοῦ ἐπικύκλου, ταύταις ἂν ἀπήρκεσε ταῖς πηλικότησιν ὡς ἀπαραλλάκτοις συγχρήσασθαι ‘Now if it were this eccentre on which the epicycle centre were carried, the above quantities would be sufficiently accurate to use’ [transl. Toomer 1984, 511, modified], Geog. 1.6.2 ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἑωρῶμεν μηδὲν ἐνδέον αὐτοῦ τῇ τελευταίᾳ συντάξει, κἂν ἀπήρκεσεν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τούτων μόνων τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης καταγραφήν, μηδέν τι περιεργαζομένοις ‘But if we had seen that nothing was lacking in the final redaction of his work, then it would have sufficed for us to make the description of the world based only on these commentaries of his, without troubling us any further’).

(iii) In ArrianArrian (Epict.), ἀρκέω is far more common than ἀπαρκέω (64x versus 6x). ἀπαρκέω always occurs in the third person, whether in the present (5x) or imperfect (1x), whether in a personal or impersonal construction (impersonal in Epict. 1.6.17, 1.11.28, 1.16.7, 2.14.10). As expected, the simple forms ἀρκεῖ and ἤρκει are far more common (36x) than prefixed ones.

(iv) EusebiusEusebius is the Greek writer who uses ἀπαρκέω the most. As for the impersonal constructions, he uses the present ἀπαρκεῖ (5x, see e.g. PE 11.6.27 and 15.15.9, Is. 1.43.64) and (more often) the imperfect ἀπήρκει (17x, see e.g. PE 5.3.4, E.Th. 1.20.54, Is. 1.41.182 and 2.16.100, VC 3.27.1, Commentaria in Psalmos 21 fr. 7 Villani–Kim–Gleede–Coullet, 45 fr. 2 Villani–Kim–Gleede–Coullet). Eusebius occasionally uses the aorist ἀπήρκεσεν in an impersonal construction (Commentaria in Psalmos 57 § 7 Brandt–Coullet). In Eusebius’ writings, ἀπαρκέω predominantly occurs in the third person (29x, present and imperfect), compared to the other forms of the conjugation (a total of 8x: 4x present infinitive, 2x present participle, and 2x imperfect indicative 3rd person plural). Even though ἀρκέω is more common than ἀπαρκέω and is used in a wider variety of forms, ἀπαρκέω is Eusebius’ preference in some forms. Notice in particular that the imperfect ἀπήρκει is used 17x, while ἤρκει appears only 7x.

(v) Didymus CaecusDidymus Caecus only uses ἀπαρκέω in the present ἀπαρκεῖ (5x, both in personal impersonal constructions), whereas he uses ἀρκέω far more often (55x) and in a variety of forms and constructions.

Altogether, the evidence suggests several conclusions. First, ἀπαρκέω was predominantly used in the third person and mostly in impersonal constructions. This explains why Moeris (A.1) was particularly interested in identifying an authoritative Attic source which would legitimate this use of ἀπαρκέω. Secondly, since ἀπαρκέω is far less common than ἀρκέω throughout the history of Greek, ἀπαρκέω was occasionally preferred in texts where the intensified form perhaps conveyed a sense of authority, as in technical writings, official documents, and judicial debates. In other cases, ἀπαρκέω was favoured over ἀρκέω because it proved a less banal and more conspicuous choice of word. The rarity of ἀπαρκέω and the select contexts in which it appears together confirm the conclusions put forward above concerning the Atticist lexicographers’ interest in this verb.

E. Byzantine and Modern Greek commentary

ἀπαρκέω is a genuine rarity in Byzantine texts. Only four occurrences are documented in texts other than lexicographical compilations (C.8; Michael Psellus Historia brevis 87 Aerts; Τιπούκειτος 44.17.129; Theodorus Meliteniotes De astronomia libri 20.4). More specifically, the only Byzantine occurrence of impersonal ἀπαρκεῖ is in the passage of George Pachymeres (C.8, on which see F.7), who also uses this form in a personal construction (Quadrivium 2.19.52–3). One may compare George Pachymeres with Ptolemy’s use of ἀπαρκέω, insofar as the prefixed verb was suited to technical writings. Unlike ἀπαρκέω, the simple verb ἀρκέω is very common in Byzantine, Medieval, and Early Modern Greek (see CGMEMG vol. 3, 1340), and is still vital in Modern Greek (including in the impersonal construction αρκεί ‘it suffices’; see further ILNE s.v.). This distribution of ἀπαρκέω and ἀρκέω helps us make sense of Thomas Magister’s (B.1, on which see F.4) preference for ἀπαρκεῖ over ἀρκεῖ, an opinion which is unparalleled in extant ancient sources and which is, furthermore, ill supported by the sheer distribution of the two forms. In other words, while in antiquity the Attic pedigree of ἀπαρκεῖ is not beyond doubt – indeed, Atticist lexicographers are not keen to recommend it to the aspiring Atticist (see D.) – since ἀπαρκέω is a rarity compared to ἀρκέω, ἀπαρκέω gained a sociolinguistic prestige, according to the linguistic sensibility of a Byzantine erudite like Thomas Magister, which it had never previously enjoyed (this may also be due to the influence of tragedy, see F.4).

F. Commentary on individual texts and occurrences

(1)    Moer. ο 34 (A.1)

Considering the typical structure of his lexicon, Moeris could be understood here as recommending Aristophanes’ οὐκ ἀπήρκει as the pure Attic equivalent of οὐκ ἀπέχρη. Such an explanation, however, is not convincing. For a start, ἀντὶ τοῦ does not necessarily entail that this gloss has a prescriptive and proscriptive intent. Secondly, the imperfect ἀπέχρη does not raise any suspicion as far as its formation is concerned, given that it is attested in Attic writers who were considered more than trustworthy (see e.g. Pl. Phdr. 275b.7–9, D. 21.35, and Aeschin. 3.227). Hence, it is unlikely that the gloss should be read according to the typical scheme Ἀττικοί versus Ἕλληνες. A far more convincing interpretation is that this gloss aims to point out that ἀπαρκέω may legitimately be used in an impersonal construction, as proved by οὐκ ἀπήρκει in Aristophanes’ Polyidus. It is quite likely that the Attic pedigree of ἀπαρκέω may have been deemed dubious compared to more common forms like ἀρκέω and ἐξαρκέω (see D.). Hence, this should be deemed a synonymic-onomastic entrySynonymic-onomastic, in which ἀντὶ τοῦ functions as an equivalent of ‘meaning’ or ‘equivalent to’ (one may compare e.g. Moer. α 149, α 164, δ 1, δ 24, etc.). This is a very intriguing case as far as Moeris’ agenda is concerned, in that he clearly defends a usage which probably sounded suspiciously new or informal by tracing it back to an isolated classical occurrence. One would normally expect this kind of strategy in more open-minded Atticist lexicographers, especially the Antiatticist, offering further evidence of how misleading it is to pose a rigid division between stricter and less strict Atticists.

(2)    Poll. 9.154 (A.2)

At 9.129, Pollux says that since he has finished the discussion of παιδιαί, he will conclude the book with lists of synonyms or things which are similar. These lists, which are all unrelated to one another, occupy 9.130–62, that is, they extend until the end of the book. The list of synonyms at 9.154 is among them. Typically, Pollux opens the lists with a key form to which the others are connected, and it is thus quite likely that Phrynichus here offers – in phrasing that is now, due to epitomisation, extremely brachylogical – a list of all the ways in which one can say ‘it is enough’. Such a list of synonyms has no special evaluative capacity; nor does Pollux specially recommend these forms as good Attic Greek. Notice that in this list, he also recommends three forms that are unattested, or barely attested, in Attic: ἀπόχρη, which is non-Attic (see Moer. α 9Moer. α 9 ἀποχρῆ περισπομένως [i.e ἀποχρῇ] <Ἀττικοί>· ἀπόχρη βαρυτόνως <Ἕλληνες> ‘<Users of Attic> [employ] ἀποχρῇ with a perispomenon accent, while <users of Greek> [employ] ἀπόχρη with a paroxytone accent’); αὐτάρκως, which occurs once in Aristotle and then belongs to koine Greek; ὑπεραποχρώντως, which is a hapax.

(3)    Ar. fr. 474 (C.2)

Despite the brevity of the quoted text, the fact that Moeris uses οὐκ ἀπέχρη to explain Aristophanes’ οὐκ ἀπήρκει makes it very likely that Aristophanes used ἀπήρκει as part of an impersonal construction.

(4)    Thom.Mag. 24.15–6 (B.1)

The transmitted reading in the mss. of Sophocles’ Electra is ἐπαρκούντως δ’ ἐμοίSoph. El. 354. Editors of Sophocles normally retain the transmitted text and consider ἀπαρκούντως in Thomas Magister ‘an intelligent conjecture’ (Finglass 2007, 200, who also compares ἐπαρκούντως in Electra with ἐπαρκέσει ‘it will suffice’ in Soph. Ant. 612–3). The same oscillation between ἀπαρκ- and ἐπαρκ- is documented in the sources which quote the Solon passage (C.1), but in this case the correct reading is ἀπαρκεῖ rather than ἐπαρκεῖ (see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 285–6 for a convincing examination of this textual problem). Regarding Thomas Magister’s preference for ἀπαρκεῖ over the simple verb ἀρκεῖ see E.. The fact that Thomas took ἀπαρκούντως rather than ἐπαρκούντως as the correct reading in Sophocles, together with the fact that ἀπαρκέω is predominantly a tragic word in classical sources (see D.), is likely to have contributed further to his favouring ἀπαρκεῖ over ἀρκέω.

(5)    Oliver (1941, 78–82 no. 34), lines 7–9 (C.6)

This inscription is an official letter from a Roman magistrate to an Athenian συνέδριον, arguably that of the Panhellenes. As reconstructed by Oliver (1941, 81), the likely context is that the συνέδριον had sent a formal embassy to the Roman magistrate, asking to punish someone who refused to carry out a liturgical obligation. As observed by Oliver, this is a very courteous letter, and the magistrate is clearly sympathetic towards the συνέδριον and its motives. The use of the intensifying ἀπαρκέω may well be strategical in laying emphasis on the fact that the συνέδριον should not have taken the trouble to carry out an investigation and that what the magistrate had already witnessed first-hand would certainly have been enough for him to confirm that the complaints of the συνέδριον were well-founded.

(6)    P.Mil.Vogl. 1.25.col. iii.22–3 (C.7)

The verb ἀπαρκεῖ occurs in the reported speech of the ῥήτωρ Palamedes, who is speaking on behalf of his client Paulinus (on the trial, see Arangio-Ruiz 1937, 208–11 and Heath 2004a, 65–70). A careful reconstruction of this section of the trial is provided by Heath (2004a, 68–9 and 2004b, 312–4), who offers an enlightening reconstruction of the different strategies pursued by Palamedes and the opponent’s advocate; Heath also points out the very different qualities and rhetorical skills that the two ῥήτορες display (Palamedes is far more rhetorically skilled than his opponent). In the passage under consideration here, Palamedes makes ‘the demand for evidence […] into his final, climactic move’ (Heath 2004b, 313). The use of ἀπαρκεῖ may very well be additional evidence for the intensified tone of Palamedes’ utterance, which is further proved by the use of τοι, the impersonal ὀφείλει (see LSJ s.v. III), and the anacoluthon τοῦ Γ[εμείνου, ἀλ]λὰ κα[ὶ] γράμμα[τ]α τ[ο]ῦ Δ[ε]ί|[ο]υ.

(7)    Georgius Pachymeres Quadrivium 2.16.1–5 (C.8)

This highly technical passage requires some comment. The χρόαι (‘nuances’) are the divisions within each musical γένος (‘disposition of intervals’). They are defined in terms of the different intervals which characterise each γένος. The γένος is defined by the different intervals which constitute a tetrachord, depending on the χρόαι. The three γένη are diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic, and each of them is further defined by different χρόαι. Diatonic scales consist in the alternation of tones and semitones and are typically recognised as more austere (this system is familiar for us, accustomed as we are to a predominantly equal temperament). The enharmonic and chromatic scales constitute their tetrachord on the basis of smaller intervals. The chromatic scale has different χρόαι. Two of these χρόαι are the μαλακόν (‘soft’) and the σύντονον (‘tense’). While the μαλακόν is defined by intervals smaller than the semitone, the σύντονον only consists in semitones and their multiples. Thus, the σύντονον is somewhat closer to the more austere diatonic scale, insofar as it is not constituted by intervals smaller than the semitone. To sum up, George Pachymeres is making the point that the diatonic scale is the more natural one to the human ear, whose simplicity he clearly approves of (arguably from a Christian perspective), and that it is not enough to ‘save’ the other two γένη by extending their intervals, e.g., making them similar to the σύντονον of the chromatic γένος, in a fashion that is closer to the austerity of the diatonic scale. For a more detailed discussion of the musical doctrines which are presupposed by this passage see Michaelides (1978, 64–7, 79, 100–1, 121–2).